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Abstract: We argue that confusability between items should be distin-
guished from generalization between items. Shepard’s data concern con-
fusability, but the theories proposed by Shepard and by Tenenbaum & Grif-
fiths concern generalization, indicating a gap between theory and data. We
consider the empirical and theoretical work involved in bridging this gap.
[shepard; tenenbaum & griffiths]
shepard shows a robust psychological law that relates the dis-
tance between a pair of items in psychological space and the prob-
ability that they will be confused with each other. Specifically, the
probability of confusion is a negative exponential function of the
distance between the pair of items. In experimental contexts,
items are assumed to be mentally represented as points in a mul-
tidimensional Euclidean space, and confusability is assumed to be
determined according to the distance between items in that un-
derlying mental space. The array of data that shepard amasses
for the universal law has impressive range and scope.
Although intended to have broader application, the law is pri-
marily associated with a specific experimental paradigm – the
identification paradigm. In this paradigm, human or animal agents
are repeatedly presented with stimuli concerning a (typically
small) number of items. We denote the items themselves as a, 
b, . . . , corresponding stimuli as S(A), S(B), . . . , and the corre-
sponding responses as R(A), R(B), . . . . People have to learn to as-
sociate a specific, and distinct, response with each item – a re-
sponse that can be viewed as “identifying” the item concerned.
How does a law concerning confusability in the identification
paradigm relate to the question of generalization? We suggest that
there is no direct relationship. Generalization from item A to item
B in the sense discussed by shepard, involves deciding that an
item b has property f, because item a has property f. This is an in-
ductive inference: f(A), therefore f(B). By contrast, confusing item
A with B means misidentifying item A as being item B. General-
ization typically does not involve any such misidentification: on
learning that a person has a spleen, I may suspect that a goldfish
has a spleen – but there is no need to misidentify or mix up peo-
ple and goldfish.
These observations suggest that there may be a gap between
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shepard’s theoretical analysis, which considers the question of
generalization, and his empirical data-base, which concerns con-
fusability. This points up two distinct research projects, attempt-
ing to reconnect theory and data.
The first project attempts to connect theory to data. This re-
quires gathering empirical data concerning generalization, to see
to what extent generalization does have the negative exponential
form predicted from shepard’s theoretical analysis. This project
is, to a limited degree, taken up in tenenbaum & griffiths’
empirical studies of generalization from single and multiple in-
stances. These preliminary results suggest that the generalization
function appears to be concave, which also fits with their Bayesian
theoretical analysis. Whether the data have an exponential form,
and whether there is a universal pattern of data across many dif-
ferent classes of stimuli, must await further empirical work. But
some of our own results have suggested that generalization may
be surprisingly variable, both between individuals and across tri-
als, even with remarkably simple stimuli.
Stewart and Chater (submitted) investigated generalization to
novel stimuli intermediate between two categories that differ in
variability. The effect of the variability of the categories differed
greatly between participants – some participants classified inter-
mediate stimuli into the more similar, less variable category; oth-
ers classified the intermediate stimuli into the less similar, more
variable category. Further, altering the variability of the training
categories had large effects on individual participants’ generaliza-
tion. When the difference in variability between the two cate-
gories was increased, some people increased generalization to the
more variable category, and some increased generalization to the
less variable category. Extant exemplar (e.g., Nosofsky 1986) and
parametric/distributional (e.g., Ashby & Townsend 1986) models
of generalization in categorization cannot predict the large varia-
tion between participants. This individual variation in perfor-
mance suggests that there may be no single law governing human
generalization, and therefore, that performance may not fit into
shepard’s theoretical analysis, although it is too early to draw firm
conclusions on this issue.
The second project arises from the apparent gap between the-
oretical analysis and empirical data in shepard’s program con-
cerns connecting data to theory. shepard has provided a strong
evidence that confusability is an inverse exponential function of
distance in an internal multidimensional space. How can this re-
sult be explained theoretically? The rest of this commentary de-
velops a possible approach.
To begin with, we note that the view of psychological distance
as Euclidean distance in an internal multidimensional space may
be too restrictive to be applicable to many aspects of cognition. It
is typically assumed that the cognitive representation formed of a
visually presented object, a sentence or a story, will involve struc-
tured representations. Structured representations can describe an
object not just as a set of features, or as a set of numerical values
along various dimensions, but in terms of parts and their interre-
lations, and properties that attach to those parts. For example, in
describing a bird, it is important to specify not just the presence
of a beak, eyes, claws, and feathers, but the way in which they are
spatially and functionally related to each other. Equally, it is im-
portant to be able to specify that the beak is yellow, the claws or-
ange, and the feathers white – to tie attributes to specific parts of
an object. Thus, describing a bird, a line of Shakespeare, or the
plot of Hamlet as a point in a Euclidean multidimensional space
appears to require using too weak a system of representation. This
line of argument raises the possibility that the Universal Law may
be restricted in scope to stimuli which are sufficiently simple to
have a simple multidimensional representation – perhaps those
that have no psychologically salient part-whole structure. We shall
argue, however, that the Universal Law is applicable quite gener-
ally, since all these aspects are taken into account by the algorith-
mic information theory approach. This leads to a more general-
ized form of the Universal Law.
In particular, we measure the distance between arbitrary rep-
resentations (whether representations of points in space, of
scripts, sentences, or whatever), by the complexity of the process
of “distorting” each representation to the other. Specifically, the
distance between two representations, A and B, is defined to be
the sum of the lengths of the shortest computer program that
maps from A to B and the length of the shortest computer pro-
gram that maps from B to A. This is known as sum-distance (Li &
Vitányi 1997). Sum-distance measure is attractive not only be-
cause it has some theoretical and empirical support as a measure
of similarity (Chater & Hahn 1997; Hahn et al., submitted), but
also because it connects with the theoretical notion of information
distance, developed in the mathematical theory of Kolmogorov
complexity (Li & Vitányi 1997). (See Chater 1999, for an informal
introduction in the context of psychology.) The intuition behind
this definition is that similar representations can be “distorted”
into each other by simple processes, whereas highly dissimilar rep-
resentations can only be distorted into each other by complex pro-
cesses; the complexity of a process is then measured in terms of
the shortest computer program that codes for that process.
shepard uses a specific function, G(A, B), as a measure of the
confusability between two items. It turns out that – using only 
the assumption that the mapping between the input stimuli and
the identification responses is computable – it can be shown that
G(A, B) is proportional to the negative exponential of the sum-
distance between A and B. That is, if distance is measured in terms
of the complexity of the mapping between the representations A
and B, then shepard’s universal law, when applied to confusabil-
ity, follows automatically (Chater & Vitányi, submitted).
We have suggested that this result is attractive, because it ap-
plies in such a general setting – it does not presuppose that items
correspond to points in an internal multidimensional psychologi-
cal space. This observation suggests a further line of empirical re-
search: to determine whether the Universal Law does indeed hold
in these more general circumstances.
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